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MARI-

IS NOT PRECLUDED BY

DECEDENT'S RECOVERY FOR INJURIES PRIOR TO HIS DEATH-Sea-

Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
Awtrey C. Gaudet, a longshore foreman, was severely injured
while participating in loading operations aboard the S.S. Claiborne
which was moored in Louisiana navigable waters.' Alleging that the
accident and resulting injuries were proximately caused by the vessel's
unseaworthy condition, 2 Gaudet sued Sea-Land Services, Inc., the
owner and operator of the vessel, to recover for his personal injuries and
s
lost earnings. A verdict of $175,000 was returned in Gaudet's favor,
but he died before final judgment was entered.4 After final disposition
of the case, and payment to the deceased's estate, Helen Gaudet com1 Stein v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 440 F.2d 1181, 1181 (5th Cir. 1971).
2 Id. Seaworthiness is a duty imposed by general maritime law to provide a safe
working place for the vessel's crewmen. The vessel must be "reasonably adequate, in
materials, construction, equipment, stores, officers, men and outfit for the trade or
service in which the vessel is employed." Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, 837-38
(1st Cir. 1952). See generally The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). The duty is non-delegable
and absolute; neither the owner's negligence nor his knowledge of the unseaworthy
condition is required for the libellant ,to pursue his claim. Unseaworthiness is recognized
as "essentially a species of liability without fault." Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S.
85, 94 (1946). See generally Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Mahnich
v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). The seaworthiness doctrine has been extended
to libels in which persons other than the ship's crew have been injured as a result of
the performance of a ship's service at the owner's consent. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc.
v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) (carpenter); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, supra (stevedore).
For a general discussion of the seaworthiness doctrine see 2 M. NoRIss, LAW OF SEAMEN
§ 609 et seq. (2d ed. 1962).
Seaworthiness is to be distinguished from the seaman's ancient general maritime
right to maintenance and cure. Under that doctrine, members of the ship's company who,
as a result of their contractual relationship, become injured or ill while in the service of
the vessel on land or aboard ship, are entitled to food, lodging, and medical care until the
,.maximum cure" possible is realized. A seaman's negligence will not bar recovery; however, a sailor's own gross or willful misconduct will preclude entitlement. 1 E. BENEDICr,
THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY § 83 (6th ed. rev. 1940); 1 M. NORRIs, supra §§ 537,
543, 545, 549, 551.
3 Stein v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 440 F.2d 1181, 1181 (5th Cir. 1971). The award was
reduced to $140,000 as a result of a finding of Gaudet's contributory negligence. Id. at
1181-82. Although under general maritime law, contributory negligence is neither a defense
nor a bar to an action, damages are mitigated proportionately to the libellant's negligence.
See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408-09 (1953); The Arizona v. Anelich,
298 U.S. 110, 122 (1936).
4 Stein v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 440 F.2d 1181, 1181 n.l (5th Cir. 1971).
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menced a wrongful death action in federal district court for her damages resulting from the loss of her husband. 5
The district court concluded that the decedent's prior recovery
precluded the plaintiff's wrongful death action and dismissed her suit
based on both res judicata and failure to state a claim.6 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff's cause of action was not
extinguished by her husband's prior recovery for personal injuries because a clear distinction existed between actions for personal injury and
wrongful death in admiralty. 7 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, 8 and in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet9 affirmed
the court of appeals by a narrow margin.10 Acknowledging conflicting
state and federal decisions on the question, the Court concluded that
the policies underlying wrongful death actions and the tradition of
humaneness and liberality implicit in admiralty proceedings permitted
recovery by the libellant despite her husband's successful suit for his
own personal injuries."'
Although currently permitted by statute, historically, recovery for
wrongful death or the survival of a deceased's claims was precluded by
judicial principles which originated in the English common law.' 2 The
refusal of the courts to recognize a cause of action based on wrongful
death appears to have been founded upon a merger theory which
evolved from the overlapping of criminal and civil remedies in early
English law.' 3 According to this theory, when the wrongful act which
5 Gaudet v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 463 F.2d 1331, 1332 (5th Cir. 1972).
6 Id. at 1332.
7 Id. at 1336.
8 Gaudet v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 411 U.S. 963 (1973).
9 94 S. Ct. 806 (1974).
10 Dissenting in the 5-4 decision was Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist.
11 94 S. Ct. at 812, 814.
12 F. TIFFANY, DEAT BY WRONGFUL AcT § 1 (1893). For a comprehensive analysis of
wrongful death recovery and a more recent survey of the development of statutory
remedies see S. SPsF'ER, REcovEav FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (1966).
13 According to Holdsworth, the roots of the merger doctrine can be traced to an
early confusion in English law between the concepts of ownership and possession of chattels. Thus, when chattels were wrongfully taken, the thief was deemed to have "property"
in the goods, and subject to a few narrow exceptions, the crown was entitled to the
goods. Because a conviction for a felony was most advantageous for the king, in time the
criminal indictment became preferred over the action for trespass as a remedy. Ultimately,
this preference evolved into the more general proposition that any tortious conduct which
amounted to a felony precluded an individual's civil right of action. 3 W. HOLDSwORTH,
A HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 327-31 (4th ed. 1935). Somewhat later, the effect of the merger
doctrine was modified by suspending the civil cause of action until the criminal prosecution for the public wrong had been completed. This qualification, however,
had little effect in the wrongful death cases because as long as the punish-
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caused the death also constituted felonious activity, the civil action was
barred by its merger into the criminal offense. 14 Thus, the individual's
right of action was preempted by a superior governmental interest in
punishing criminal activity.
Although the merger concept was initially articulated in a case
involving a felonious assault, 15 the principle was also applied early in
the nineteenth century to preclude recovery by a third person who had
an interest in the deceased even though the death resulted from a noncriminal, negligent act.'6 Of less certain origin, a related common law
ment for felonious homicide was both execution and forfeiture of property there
would be no way to enforce any damages judgment obtained by pursuing the
suspended civil cause of action after a successful criminal prosecution.
Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REv. 605, 612
(1960). See also 3 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra at 333.
14 An early English court explained the merger concept, and the paramount governmental interest in punishing felonious activity which gave rise to the doctrine, by observing that
if a man beats the servant of J. S. so that he dies of that battery, the master shall
not have an action against the other for the battery and loss of the service,
because the servant dying of the extremity of the battery, it is now become an
offence to the Crown, being converted into felony, and that drowns the particular
offence, and private wrong offer'd to the master before, and his action is thereby
lost ....
Higgins v. Butcher, 80 Eng. Rep. 61, 61 (K.B. 1607) (emphasis added).
15 Id. See also Smith v. Sykes, 89 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1677).
16 In Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808), a suit involving a husband's
claim for the loss of his deceased wife's society after she died from injuries sustained in a
stagecoach accident, Lord Ellenborough, sitting nisi prius, held that "[i]n a civil Court,
the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury." Id. The opinion
reflects neither sound reasoning nor an authoritative basis, and it has beefi variously
criticized. Holdsworth has characterized the rule as "obviously unjust . . . technically
unsound," while Prosser has depicted Lord Ellenborough as one "whose forte was never
common sense." Compare 3 W. HoLDswoRTm, supra note 13, at 336 (footnote omitted) with
W. PROSSER, TnE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 901 (4th ed. 1971). Lord Ellenborough's failure
to distinguish felonious and tortious activities has also been critically received. One
commentator, emphasizing the important distinctions between Higgins and Baker, has
noted that
the denial of [a] remedy [in Higgins] was predicated on the wrongdoing being
"an offense of the Crown," a "felony," a "criminal" act. Without such a wrongdoing, the doctrine of merger would obviously not operate . . . . In the Baker
case, the wife's death resulted from the negligent driving of a stagecoach ....
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the merger doctrine was still in effect
[in 1808] ....
The opinion in the Baker case contains no reference to either of
these factors, and the suspicion is ... the rule recited was a mistaken application
of the narrower rule adopted in the Higgins case on different facts and under
different conditions.
Smedley, supra note 13, at 615-16 (footnotes omitted). See generally Note, Judicial Expansion of Remedies for Wrongful Death in Admiralty: A Proposal, 49 B.U.L. REv.
114, 117 (1969). For a comprehensive analysis of the early development of English and
American wrongful death concepts see Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN.
L. REv. 1043 (1965).
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principle evolved wlhich precluded the survival of any right of action
which the decedent had at the time of his death. 17 Consequently, in
other than exceptional circumstances based on special relationships
between the claimant and the decedent, such as husband-wife or
master-servant, 8 no right of action inured to the decedent's survivors
or to his estate.' 9
Despite an occasional rejection of the English cases which prohibited wrongful death recovery, 20 American courts have generally
followed the English view in denying recovery. 21 Mindful of the unique
English precepts which have been advanced to explain the common
law view, 22 American courts often had difficulty justifying the continu17 The basis for prohibiting survival actions was expressed in the common law
maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona (personal actions die with the person). This
concept was applicable to all tort actions and affected only the damages suffered by the
deceased and his estate. See generally Malone, supra note 16, at 1045-52; Smedley, supra
note 13, at 606-09. Thus, termination of an action is distinguishable from the preclusions
of Higgins and Bolton, in which recovery was sought for loss to the survivors. The
termination rule, however, did not preclude a suit against an executor on an action of
debt or covenant arising out of a contract under seal entered into by the testator, or on
an action to recover for unjust enrichment to the estate. 3 W. HoLDSWORTH, supra note
13, at 578-79.
18 At common law, a husband was entitled to the services of his wife and children,
and a master was entitled to the services of his servant. Any interference with this proprietary right, whether intentional or negligent, constituted an actionable wrong from
which damages would flow for lost services and medical expenses incurred prior to recovery or death. F. TIFFANY, supra note 12, § 1; Malone, supra note 16, at 1052;
Smedley, supra note 13, at 620-21; cf. Holbrook, Change in the Meaning of Consortium,
22 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1923).
19 A situation was thus created which made it more profitable to kill rather than
injure another party. W. PRossEr, supra note 16, § 127, at 902. Prosser amusingly mentions the unfounded legend that
this was the original reason that passengers in Pullman car berths rode with
their heads to the front. Also that the fire axes in railroad coaches were provided
to enable the conductor to deal efficiently with those who were merely injured.
Id. n.43.
20 Sullivan v. Union Pac. R.R., 23 F. Cas. 368, 371 (No. 13,599) (C.C.D. Neb. 1874);
Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894, 895-96 (No. 11,234) (D.C.D. Me. 1825); Ford v. Monroe,
20 Wend. 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838), overruled by, Green v. Hudson River R.R., 28 Barb.
9, 21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859), aff'd, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 277 (N.Y. 1866). Cf. Shields v. Yonge,
15 Ga. 349, 355-56 (1854).
21 The acceptance of the rule espoused in Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B.
1808), was first pronounced in Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (Sup. Jud.
Ct. 1848), and has been accepted in America ever since. However, prior to 1848, a few
American jurisdictions had permitted death claims. See Malone, supra note 16, at 1066-67.
22 While the practice of merging the private wrong into the felony had been accepted to a limited extent, the subsequent forfeiture of the felon's property to the government had not been adopted in America. See, e.g., Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894, 895-96
(No. 11,234) (D.C.D. Me. 1825); Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 185-88 (1867).
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ation of the no recovery principle. 23 A number of courts justified the
rule simply on the basis of its firm entrenchment in the common law.2 4
Other courts, however, predicated their refusal to permit recovery on
the basis of an inability to calculate the pecuniary value of life, or
upon an unwillingness to allow "the value of [a] human life to become
the subject of judicial computation. ' 25 Finally, many courts feared
that potentially unlimited recoveries would work substantial injustice
upon merely negligent tortfeasors. 26 Thus, whatever the theoretical
justification for the no recovery rule, the courts remained insensitive
to the plight of the decedent's survivors who were irreparably harmed
by the wrongdoer. Ultimately, this remedial vacuum was filled by the
legislatures which adjusted the balance in favor of designated survivors
27
of those who died as a result of wrongful acts.
The prototype legislative response was Lord Campbell's Act of
1846.28 This Act created an action for damages resulting from death
23 See generally Smedley, supra note 13, at 616-19.
24 Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475, 478 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1848); Grosso v.
Delaware, L & W.R.R., 50 N.J.L. 317, 323, 13 A. 233, 236 (Sup. Ct. 1888); Green v. Hudson
River R.R., 28 Barb. 9, 15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859), afl'd, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 277 (N.Y. 1866).
25 Grosso v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 50 N.J.L. 317, 320, 13 A. 233, 235 (Sup. Ct. 1888).
See also Van Amburg v. Vicksburg, S. & Pac. R.R., 37 La. Ann. 650, 651 (1885); Green v.
Hudson River R.R., 28 Barb. 9, 17-18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859), aff'd, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 277
(N.Y. 1866).
26 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H.R.R., 25 Conn. 265, 272-73
(1856); see Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 196-97 (1867).
27 It is significant that most of the American cases which were decided after Baker v.
Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808), was first applied in the United States were considered in the wake of the enactment of limited wrongful death or survival statutes. See
Malone, supra note 16, at 1073. The same author has attributed the unwillingness of the
courts to fashion a common law death remedy independent of the statutory scheme to
a judicial reluctance to "compete" with the fledgling legislation and suggested that
[h]ad the several state legislatures remained insensitive to the death problem, thus
obliging the courts to face it in an open field, it can be surmised that a commonlaw death action of some kind would have unfolded on the American scene.
Id.
28 An Act for compensating the Families of Persons killed by Accidents, 9 & 10 Vict.,
c. 93 (1846). The Act provides in pertinent part:
[I.] [W]hensoever the Death of a Person shall be caused by wrongful Act, Neglect,
or Default, [of another] and the Act, Neglect, or Default is such as would (if
Death had not ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain an Action and
recover Damages in respect thereof, then and in every such Case the Person who
would have been liable if Death had not ensued shall be liable to an Action for
Damages, notwithstanding the Death of the Person injured, and although the
Death shall have been caused under such Circumstances as amount in Law to
Felony.
II. And be it enacted, That every such Action shall be for the Benefit of the
Wife, Husband, Parent, and Child of the Person whose Death shall have been so
caused, and shall be brought by and in the Name of the Executor or Administrator of the Person deceased; and in every such -Action the Jury may give such
Damages as they may think proportioned to the Injury resulting from such Death
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"caused by wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default." 29 The action could be
brought by the executor or administrator of the estate for the benefit
of a class of designated beneficiaries. 80 In creating the wrongful death
remedy, Lord Campbell's Act specifically abrogated the historical preclusion of recovery where the circumstances of death amounted to a
felony.81 Judicially construed in England, the statute was held to
create an action which was "new in its species, new in its quality, [and]
new in its principle, in every way new,"8 2 as opposed to simply continuing the deceased's actionable complaints. Since the enactment of
the Act, American legislatures have provided similar recovery for
wrongful death.8 3 In substance, the majority of the statutes closely
parallel Lord Campbell's Act by providing an action for losses suffered
by prescribed beneficiaries. 34 Following their English counterparts,
American courts have construed the action as an independent right
accruing at the death of the decedent. 5 Additionally, some of the
American statutes have supplemented the basic wrongful death action
by permitting the survival of whatever claims a deceased might have
asserted, had he lived.36 Thus, in jurisdictions where both wrongful
death and survival statutes have been enacted, full reparation for
wrongs to the deceased and his survivors is possible.
to the Parties respectively for whom and for whose Benefit such Action shall be
brought ....
29 Id. § I.
30 Id. § II.
31 Id. § I.
32 Seward v. The "Vera Cruz," 10 App. Cas. 59, 70-71 (P.C. 1884). See also Nunan v.
Southern Ry., [1924] 1 K.B. 223, 227, 229 (C.A. 1923).
23 All states have statutorily abrogated the common law prohibitions on recovery for
death damages, and have provided remedies that vary considerably from exclusive wrongful death actions to combinations of both wrongful death and survival remedies. See 2
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 24.1-24.2 (1956). See generally Duffey, The
Maldistributionof Damages in Wrongful Death, 19 OHIO S.L.J. 264 (1958). For a complete
listing of federal, state, and English wrongful death statutes see S. SPEISER, supra note 12,
at Appendix A; Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REV.
402, 437-39 (1966).
Survival statutes preserve for the estate the rights of action possessed by the injured
party at his death, thus supplanting the common law maxim actio personalis moritur
cum persona. Typically, the deceased's pain and suffering, lost wages, and medical expenses
are compensable under a survival statute, as contrasted with recoveries under wrongful
death statutes which compensate the beneficiary for his losses. D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.2, at 553 (1973); Duffey, supra at 264, 266-67. See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra, § 24.2, at 1284 & n.2.
34 W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 127, at 902; F. TIFFANY, supra note 12, § 24.
85 See, e.g., Garrett v. Louisville & N.R.R., 235 U.S. 308, 312 (1914); Michigan Cent.
R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 69 (1913). See also Schumacher, Rights of Action Under
Death and Survival Statutes, 23 MIcH. L. REv. 114, 116 (1924).
86 Comment, supra note 33, at 404. See also D. DOBBS, supra note 33, § 8.2, at 552-54.
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Included in the damages under wrongful death statutes have been
recoveries measured predominantly against either the losses suffered by
the deceased's beneficiaries or against those suffered by the estate as a
result of the death.37 Historically, in either application, damages have
been confined to pecuniary losses; 8 however, this limitation has not
been applied literally by the courts. The early relaxation of the strict
pecuniary damage requirement in wrongful death recoveries is illustrated by Tilley v. Hudson River R.R.,8 9 in which the court recognized
that the concept of pecuniary damage should not be so
limited as to confine it to the immediate loss of money or property;
for if that were so, there is scarcely a case where any amount of
damages could be recovered. It looks to prospective advantages of
a pecuniary nature, which have been cut off by the premature
death of the person from whom they would have proceeded; and
the word pecuniary was used [in the statute] in distinction to those
injuries to the affections and sentiments which arise from the
death of relatives .... 40
Thus, besides the normal award for the value of lost services and financial contributions, recovery has been frequently permitted for children's loss of parental care, guidance and control, 41 and occasionally
for the survivor's mental anguish. 42 Moreover, one commentator has
identified a trend in recent years to further relax the restrictive interpretation of pecuniary loss and to permit damages for the loss of so43
ciety, companionship and other intangible injuries.
While not derived from the common law, admiralty law has as37 D. DOBBS, supra note 33, § 8.3, at 556-57. Alabama and Massachusetts, however,
are exceptions to these standards, measuring damages by the degree of the wrongdoer's
culpability. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 123 (1960); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
For a case interpreting the Alabama statute as providing damages that are basically punitive in nature see Bonner v. Williams, 370 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1966).
38 See W. PaossR, supra note 16, § 127, at 907-08; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, supra
note 33, § 25.14-15, at 1329, 1332-33; F. TIFFANY, supra note 12, §§ 153-54.
39 24 N.Y. 471 (Sup. Ct. 1862), afl'd, 29 N.Y. 252 (Ct. App. 1864).
40 24 N.Y. at 475-76 (emphasis by the court). In order to determine pecuniary loss,
courts have generally measured the survivors' reasonable expectation of material assistance.
See, e.g., Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70-73 (1913). See also F. TIFFANY,
supra note 12, § 158.
41 E.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Holbrook, 235 U.S. 625 (1915); Mascuilli v. United States,
343 F. Supp. 439, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 483 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1973).
42 E.g., Guarniere v. Henderson, 171 So. 2d 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (mental pain
and suffering); Palmer v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 126 So. 2d 777 (La. Ct. App. 1960)
(shock, grief and mental pain).
43 Page, Damages for Wrongful Death Under FELA-Deprivation of Parent's Intellectual, Moral and Physical Training as "Pecuniary" Loss to Children, 30 NACCA L.J.
271, 281-82 (1964).
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similated the original common law preclusion of recovery for wrongful
death. Admiralty or general maritime law, greatly influenced by the
Roman civil law, is a composite of the ancient and international codes
and customs of the sea. 4 Although in the United States the Constitution commits "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction" to
the federal courts,4 5 admiralty does not provide the sole relief available
for an injured party. In personam common law remedies available
under state law were preserved by the Judiciary Act of 1789.46 Thus,
where an appropriate common law in personam claim attached, there
was concurrent jurisdiction in admiralty. 47 Although traditionally
cognizant of all maritime contracts, torts and injuries 48 admiralty
jurisdiction was originally restricted to the English limitation of the
"ebb and flow of the tide. ' 4 9 Today, however, admiralty jurisdiction
has expanded to encompass most actions which occur on navigable
waters.50 In exercising their judicial powers under the admiralty
44 See G. GILMoRE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§ 1-1, 1-3 (1957);

1 M. NOR-

supra note 2, § 20; G. ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY LAW § 1, at 1-4 (1939).
45 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
46 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76. Section 9 provides in pertinent part
that the district courts shall have
exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy,
where the common law is competent to give it ....
1 Stat. at 77. The present statutory provisions have codified the original Act in slightly
different language, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
47 However, when a libellant pursues an in rem action, jurisdiction is restricted exclusively to admiralty. 1 M. NoRIus, supra note 2, § 23, at 35-36; G. ROBINSON, supra note
44, § 4, at 23-24. Such actions are predicated upon a maritime lien, which is an interest in
the property involved, usually the ship itself, which accrues to the libellant after "the occurrence of certain mishaps or the non-fulfillment of certain obligations arising out of
contract or status." G. GILMoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 44, § 1-12, at 31.
48 See De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). See generally G. GILMoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 44, § 1-10, at 20-28.
49 The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428, 429 (1825).
50 Admiralty jurisdiction extends to all public navigable rivers, lakes and connecting
waterways. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1851). Even a
natural or artificial navigable waterway which is wholly within state boundaries will fall
within admiralty's jurisdiction where "they form in their ordinary condition by themselves,
or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be
carried." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). See also In re Garnett, 141
U.S. 1 (1890); Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884). Traditionally, the locality test has been
followed in order to invoke admiralty jurisdiction in a tortious situation. Therefore, any
tort which has been committed on the high seas or navigable waters will come under
admiralty jurisdiction. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 35 (1865). However, this concept has been modified in recent years whereby jurisdiction is invoked only if the wrong
bears a "significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Executive Jet Aviation,
Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972) (jurisdiction denied for property
damage where plane crashed into Lake Erie); accord, Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th
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clause, the federal courts have generally not hesitated to either expand
the concept of navigability in order to invoke their maritime jurisdiction, or to create new remedies where circumstances required judicial
innovation. 5' Until relatively recently, however, a similar spirit of
flexibility has not been evident in the context of maritime wrongful
death.
Prior to the late nineteenth century, the cases were in conflict on
the question of wrongful death recovery in admiralty, 52 but in 1886
the Supreme Court resolved the issue in an historic decision which
shaped maritime law for nearly a century. In The Harrisburg," an
action by a deceased first officer's widow to recover for his death which
was occasioned by the negligent collision between two vessels, the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the circuit court which had permitted recovery.5 4 In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that
wrongful death, even in the admiralty context, could not be maintained
in the absence of statutory authorization:
Since, however, it is now established that in the courts of the
United States no action at law can be maintained for such a wrong
in the absence of a statute giving the right, and it has not been
shown that the maritime law ... has established a different rule
... we are forced to the conclusion that no such action will lie in

the courts of the United States under the general maritime law.
The rights of persons in this particular under the maritime law of
Cir. 1973) (shooting of deer poacher piloting outboard boat was sufficient for court to
assume jurisdiction); Jiles v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. La. 1973)
(painter fell off ladder on stripped ship-jurisdiction denied).
51 Justice Brennan indicated the expansiveness of the judiciary's role in admiralty
when he said:
. Admiralty law is primarily judge-made law. The federal courts have a most
extensive responsibility of fashioning rules of substantive law in maritime cases.
The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 611 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). For specific examples of judicially-fashioned remedies in admiralty
see Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (maritime wrongful death
remedy); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (unseaworthiness).
52 A substantial number of lower courts had permitted a death action in admiralt.
The Columbia, 27 F. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1886); The Garland, 5 F. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1881); Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386 (No. 6625) (D.C.D. Md. 1879); The Towanda, 24
F. Cas. 74 (No. 14,109) (C.C.ED. Pa. 1877); The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909 (No. 12,578)
(C.C.D. Md. 1865); Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894 (No. 11,234) (D.C.D. Me. 1825).
53 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
54 Although recognizing decisions which have permitted maritime death recovery,
the Court stated:
[W]e know of no country that has adopted a different rule on this subject for the
sea from that which it maintains on the land, and the maritime law, as accepted
and received by maritime nations generally, leaves the matter untouched.
Id. at 213.
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this country are not different from those under the common
law .... 55
Although the Harrisburg Court expressed no opinion on the
question of whether the action could be brought under state wrongful
death statutes, 56 subsequent cases have permitted reliance on state statutes to provide a wrongful death remedy under appropriate circumstances. 57 Thus, until Congress responded with appropriate measures,
local statutes provided the sole remedy for maritime wrongful death. 58
Because the application of state statutes projected a diversity of
remedies and qualifications into maritime law, the uniformity desired
in admiralty59 was illusory. Consequently, the extension of state remedies was ultimately confined to basic wrongful death and survival actions. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,60 an action under the state's
55 Id. at 213-14.

56 Id. at 214.
57 See, e.g., The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907); The City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98
(S.D.N.Y. 1893). Some pre-Harrisburgdecisions had adopted the same method of recovery.
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1872).
State wrongful death statutes have been applied by admiralty courts where the
incident occurred in state navigable waters or, in some instances, on the high seas where
the ship was owned by a corporation chartered under state law. Compare Western Fuel
Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921) with The Hamilton, supra at 405.
Despite the introduction of federal legislation, state actions are still cognizable in
admiralty when the death or the injury occurs on state navigable waters. See Just v.
Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 388, modified, 312 U.S. 668 (1941); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,
supra at 242. Significantly, when a state remedy is absorbed into the action, the
admiralty court is required to implement "the right as an integrated whole, with whatever
conditions and limitations the creating State has attached." The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358
U.S. 588, 592 (1959). Thus, where the state statute does not embrace a claim for unseaworthiness, the claim will be denied. See generally H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE
SuPmE COURT § 1-19, at 99-110 (1963); Magruder & Grout, Wrongful Death Within the
Admiralty Jurisdiction,35 YALE L.J. 395, 396-97 (1926).
58 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393 (1970).
59 The desirability of uniformity in maritime law can be gleaned not only from
the constitutional provision which grants admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts
but also from the clause which confers the power to enact necessary and proper laws upon
the Congress. The combined significance of these provisions is to implicitly remove
maritime law from the province of the states and thereby avoid the diversity of law
that would inevitably result. As Justice Bradley perceived when he was speaking for the
Court,
the Constitution must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and
operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been the
intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and
regulation of the several States*as that would have defeated the uniformity and
consistency at which the Constitution aimed ....
The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874).
60 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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workmen's compensation act for the accidental death of a stevedore
who was killed while unloading a vessel at pierside, the Supreme Court
recognized that while the general maritime law had been modified by
state death statutes, there were also limitations upon state power to
affect the admiralty law. 61 In denying the compensation award, the
Court declined to "define with exactness" 62 the powers of the states to
modify admiralty principles, but suggested that
no such legislation is valid if it .

.

. works material prejudice to

the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its
63
international and interstate relations.
The Court in Jensen, however, did indicate by way of dictum that
state legislation creating the right to recover for wrongful death would
be a permissible modification of maritime law.6 4 Subsequently, the
Court not only reaffirmed the position it took in Jensen, but also extended the scope of the uniformity exception to include state survival
actions as well.6 5
Recognizing the lack of uniformity in maritime wrongful death
recovery, Congress enacted two comprehensive measures in 1920 to
create federal causes of action for the survivors of deceased seamen.
The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)6 6 allows recovery in admiralty by specified relatives 67 for the death of any person "caused by
wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a
61

Id. at 216.

Id.
Id. The Court reiterated this rationale in Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247
U.S. 372, 381-83 (1918), an action instituted in state court by an injured seaman. Seeking
to recover full indemnity for his injury, the plaintiff proceeded on a negligence theory
rather than on maintenance and cure, the applicable maritime remedy. In denying
recovery, the Court emphasized that "no State has power to abolish the well recognized
maritime rule concerning measure of recovery and substitute therefor the full indemnity
rule of the common law." Id. at 382.
The Court has explicitly recognized, however, that a state may regulate local matters
if the controls do not substantially prejudice the operation of general maritime law. Thus,
the Court has allowed recovery under the state's workmen's compensation statute when
the injury arose on state navigable waters. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode, 257
U.S. 469, 477 (1922) (carpenter injured on partially completed vessel at dock).
64 244 U.S. at 216.
65 See, e.g., Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, modified, 312 U.S. 668 (1941) (survival action); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921) (wrongful death action).
66 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq. (1970).
67 The deceased's personal representative is authorized to initiate suit "for the
exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative."
Id. § 761.
62
63
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marine league from the shore of any State."'68 DOHSA does not apply
to deaths occurring in state territorial waters; 9 however, it has been
interpreted as preempting state wrongful death actions beyond state
waters.70 DOHSA further provides a remedy under the seaworthiness
doctrine since it allows a libellant to recover without proof of negligence or culpability.7 1 DOHSA, moreover, is a pure wrongful death
statute and does not contain survival benefits. Some courts, however,
72
have borrowed state statutes to achieve this purpose.
Almost simultaneously with DOHSA, Congress enacted the Merchant Marine Act of

1920.78

In contrast to DOHSA, section 33, com-

monly known as the Jones Act, is dependent upon an employment
relationship between the deceased seaman and the libellee, and allows
recovery by the deceased's personal representative when death results
from injuries sustained during maritime employment. 4 There are no
territorial limitations as in DOHSA, but because the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) 75 is incorporated by reference, death or
survival actions can only be maintained under a negligence theory.76
68 Id.
69 Id. § 767.

See, e.g., Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 90-91 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
Chermesino v. Vessel Judith Lee Rose, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 36 (D. Mass. 1962), afl'd,
317 F.2d 927 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963).
72 Comment, Maritime Wrongful Death after Moragne: The Seaman's Legal Lifeboat, 59 GEo. L.J. 1411, 1427 & n.123 (1971); see, e.g., Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp.,
438 F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971). Some courts have improvised other means for awarding
survival benefits, for example, by joining a count under DOHSA with a count under the
Jones Act which allows survival of the claim. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 44, at
308.
73 46 U.S.C. § 861 et seq. (1970). Section 33 of the original act amended the Seaman's
Welfare Act of Mar. 4, 1915, ch. 153, § 20, 38 Stat. 1185 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 688
70
71

(1970)).
74 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). The term seaman is not defined in the Jones Act, but several
criteria have been fashioned by the courts to aid in determining the individuals who are
seamen for purposes of the Act:
(1) mhat the vessel be in navigation,
(2) that there be more or less permanent connection with the vessel, and
(3) that the worker be aboard primarily to aid in navigation.
Nelson v. Greene Line Steamers, Inc., 255 F.2d 31, 33-34 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
867 (1958). Application of these guidelines will generally Include all the vessel's crew
members. Additionally, as long as the crew members are "'engaged in the course of [their]
considered seamen while ashore. Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging
employment,"' they are still
Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 373 (1957) (quoting from Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 4 (1946)).
Harbor workers, which include longshoremen, however, are not considered seamen under
the Act. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 44, at 282. See generally I M. Nosuu, supra
note 2, §§ 1-19.
75 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
76 FELA states in pertinent part that the beneficiaries of the deceased shall have an
action
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The general maritime action of unseaworthiness, therefore, is not technically maintainable.

77

Although DOHSA and the Jones Act greatly aided the survivors
of the deceased, the legislation left serious gaps in the federal remedial
scheme. For example, when death resulted from an incident occurring
in state territorial waters which was attributable to the unseaworthy
condition of a vessel, rather than to negligence, neither statute was operable. Unless the state act recognized unseaworthiness as a basis for
78
recovery, the deceased's survivors were without a remedy.
The anomalies which existed in maritime wrongful death law
were explicitly recognized in Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc.79
The deceased in Moragne was killed while working on board a vessel
in Florida's navigable waters and an action predicated upon unseaworthiness was commenced under the state statute.8 0 Because prior
cases had established that state remedies must be adopted as an "integrated whole" in admiralty,' the lower courts accepted the state court's
determination that an action based upon unseaworthiness was not
maintainable under the state wrongful death statute and consequently
denied recovery.8 2
Cognizant of both the legislative intent exhibited in the federal
statutes and the development of unseaworthiness as a theory of recovery
for maritime injuries,'8 the Supreme Court overruled The Harrisburg
for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any
of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier ....
Id. § 51 (emphasis added).
The quest for uniformity in maritime law has resulted in the application of the
Jones Act in instances in which a seaman is injured or killed on state navigable waters
from non-negligent causes. In such circumstances, the Act has been held to be "paramount
and exclusive, and supersedes the operation of all state statutes." Lindgren v. United
States, 281 U.S. 38, 47 (1930), reafl'd in, Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148,
154-55 (1964). Consequently, even if the state statute recognized seaworthiness as a basis of
liability, no remedy would be available for the survivors of a seaman who was killed in
state waters. Perhaps as a means of ameliorating this harsh rule, maritime case law has
taken a liberal view toward allowing recovery. See, e.g., Kernan v. American Dredging
Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958) (recovery permitted, without a showing of negligence, when
death resulted from a violation of a Coast Guard regulation). See also 1 P. EDELMAN,
MARITIME INJURY AND DEATH 64-65 (1960); 2 M. NoMus, supra note 2, § 658.
77 Lee v. Pure Oil Co., 218 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1955); McLaughlin v. Blidberg Rothchild Co., 167 F. Supp. 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Carstens v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 71
F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ohio 1945); 1 P. EDELMAN, supra note 76, at 137-38.
78 See, e.g., The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 592, 594-96 (1959).
79 398 U.S. 375, 395-96 (1970).
80 Id. at 376.
s1 The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 592 (1959).
82 398 U.S. at 377.
83 The purpose of DOHSA was to provide a maritime remedy for deaths at sea; it
was not intended that the Act abrogate existing state remedies for death in state terri-
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and created an action under general maritime law for "death caused
by violation of maritime duties."84 Speaking for the Court, Justice
Harlan, in a lengthy, deliberate opinion, concluded that The Harrisburg rule was not regarded as a
closely arguable proposition-it rested on a most dubious foundation when announced, has become an increasingly unjustifiable
anomaly as the law over the years has left it behind, and, in conjunction with its corollary, The Tungus, has produced litigationspawning confusion ....

85

Additionally, in the Court's view, uniformity in admiralty law, an
objective required by both statutory and constitutional considerations,
would be advanced by the creation of a federal wrongful death remedy
to supplement existing statutes. 86 After creating the new right, however,
the Court declined to define the subsidiary issues, such as beneficiary
classifications or the proper measure of damages, which were certain to
arise in future litigation. The Court reasoned that lower courts would
not be "without persuasive analogy for guidance" 87 in DOHSA and
state wrongful death act decisions when entertaining suits under the
88
new cause of action.
torial waters. S. REP. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 4 (1919); H.R. REP. No. 674, 66th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1920). In Moragne, the Court observed that the failure of Congress
to extend the Act to cover death in state waters as well was due to a "lack of necessity"
for the extension since the states historically provided their own remedies under such circumstances. 398 U.S. at 397-98. As a result, the Court rejected the contention that
DOHSA's failure to include state territorial waters within its coverage amounted to a
congressional desire to "insulate such deaths from the benefits of any federal remedy
that might be available independently of the Act." Id. at 398. As the concept of seaworthiness evolved into a type of absolute duty under maritime law, however, the need for a
federal remedy independent of DOHSA became apparent. Consequently, the Court concluded:
Congress merely declined to disturb state remedies at a time when they appeared
adequate ....

That action [DOHSA] cannot be read . . . that deaths in terri-

torial waters, caused by breaches of the evolving duty of seaworthiness, must be
damnum absque injuria unless the States expand their remedies to match the
scope of the federal duty.
id. at 399-400.
84 398 U.S. at 409.
85 Id. at 404.;
86 In the Court's view, the uniformity desired in admiralty would be frustrated as
long as the states gave varying effect to the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. The
Court concluded that
a right to recover for wrongful death under general maritime law will assure uniform vindication of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies that
have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts.
Id. at 401.
87 Id. at 408.
88 Id. at 406-08. With respect to the designation of beneficiaries, the Court conceded
that different dependents are specified in three different statutory schemes, DOHSA, the
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Not considered in Moragne, however, were the problems associated with judgment, compromise or settlement of a deceased's claim
prior to death. Under federal and state wrongful death statutes, recovery
by the deceased's survivors after settlement or judgment prior to the
victim's death has generally been prohibited.8 9 Reflecting what is perhaps the majority view on the question, the Supreme Court in Mellon
v. GoodyearO held that a settlement under FELA barred a later suit
by the deceased's representative based upon his death. 91 Acknowledging
that the representative's right of action was independent of any which
the deceased may have possessed,92 the Court nonetheless concluded
that it was dependent "upon the existence in the decedent at the time
of his death of a right of action to recover for such injury." 93 Since even
Jones Act, and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 901 et seq. (1970), which deal with the problem. The Court, however, declined to decide
which schedule of beneficiaries governed the new remedy, reasoning that "its final resolution should await further sifting through the lower courts in future litigation." 398 U.S. at
408.
On the issue of the proper measure of damages, however, the Court specifically referred to DOHSA and state wrongful death statutes as guidelines for future litigation. Id.
Unfortunately, the Court's suggested models failed to resolve all the ambiguities in the
calculation of damages largely because the lower federal courts were often uncertain
whether to invoke DOHSA or the appropriate state statute. The choice of models to
guide the damage computation is particularly significant since the elements of damages
under state statutes are often more extensive than under DOHSA. See, e.g., In re American
Commercial Lines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Ky. 1973); In re Sincere Navigation Corp.,
329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1971). See also Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 323 F. Supp.
943 (E.D. La. 1971), in which the district court recognized that, in the wake of Moragne,
damages for maritime wrongful death must be computed by the lower federal courts on
a case by case basis. The court then suggested the shortcomings of this approach:
[I]t is obvious that, unless a single national rule of damages is evolved, potential
inequities, coupled with problems of fine distinctions will persist.
Id. at 948.
89 In effect, any occurrence which successfully terminated the injured party's cause
of action barred subsequent wrongful death recovery. Flynn v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
283 U.S. 53 (1931) (statute of limitations running on an injured party); Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U.S. 335 (1928) (settlement or release); Walrod v. Southern Pac. Co., 447 F.2d
930 (9th Cir. 1971) (judgment); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 33, § 24.6, at 1291-95;
W. PaossER, supra note 16, § 127, at 911-13; F. TIFFANY, supra note 12, § 124.
90 277 U.S. 335 (1928).
91 Id. at 343.

92 In conceding that the representative's cause of action was distinct from the
rights of the decedent, the Court referred to a prior case which had interpreted the
original Federal Employer's Liability Act as creating an action which was
"independent of any cause of action which the decedent had, and includes no
damages which he might have recovered for his injury if he had survived."
Id. at 340 (quoting from Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68 (1913)). This
reasoning was consistent with other interpretations of statutes similar to Lord Campbell's
Act. W. PRossER, supra note 16, § 127, at 902; Schumacher, supra note 35, at 115-16.
93 277 U.S. at 344.
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the beneficiary's rights, though distinct, arose out of the original wrongful act, there could only be one recovery.9 4 Thus a successful suit or
settlement during the deceased's life extinguished the survivor's con95
tingent cause of action.
The minority view is founded upon a different conception of the
nature of the survivor's rights. According to advocates of this theory,
the rights of the decedent's beneficiary accrue only at the death of the
victim. 96 Consequently, since the beneficiaries' rights are separate and
distinguishable, compromise of these claims during the deceased's life
is a legal impossibility. The damages sought to be recovered, moreover,
were not those derived from the deceased's suffering and injuries but,
rather, were damages the survivor "sustained by reason of the decedent's
death. ' 97 A state court in Johnson v. Sundbery98 articulated the minority's sentiments when it could not comprehend
the reasoning which enables an injured person to release a cause
of action which has not accrued, and cannot accrue until his death,
and which then accrues to third persons. 99
According to this view double recovery was either ignored as a legal
impossibility or was accounted for in the damage calculation by a
deduction of prior awards for prospective earnings. 100
The question of the ability of beneficiaries to maintain a maritime
death action despite the deceased's prior recovery was directly before
the Court in Gaudet. The defendant, Sea-Land, argued that the plaintiff's claim could be asserted only if "'Gaudet failed to prosecute [his
own claim] during his lifetime,' "101 and if the decedent's widow were
allowed to recover, Sea-Land would be subjected to double liability.
Drawing upon Moragne's extension of the "special solicitude" for sea94

See id. See also Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68 (1913).

95 Judicial concern for double recovery had apparently prompted this determina-

tion, since damages in either the injured party's or the survivor's suit would be measured
in some degree by the injured party's loss of prospective earnings. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 33, § 24.6, at 1292-93; W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 127, at 911-12; Fleming, The
Lost Years: A Problem in the Computation and Distributionof Damages, 50 CAL"F. L. REv.
598, 609-10 (1962). For a thorough survey of wrongful death damages and their persisting
problems see Duffey, supra note 33.
96 See, e.g., Rowe v. Richards, 35 S.D. 201, 216, 151 N.W. 1001, 1006 (1915); Duffey,
supra note 33, at 273. See also Gilmore v. Southern Ry., 229 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. La. 1964);
Goodyear v. Davis, 114 Kan. 557, 220 P. 282 (1923).
97 Blackwell v. American Film Co., 189 Cal. 689, 694, 209 P. 999, 1001 (1922).
98 150 So. 299 (La. Ct. App. 1933).
99 Id. at 301.
100 W. PRossER, supra note 16, § 127, at 912.
101 94 S. Ct, at 811 (quoting from Brief for Petitioner at 6).
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men to the dependents of deceased seafarers as a foundation, the Court
rejected Sea-Land's contentions and sanctioned Mrs. Gaudet's recovery.

1 02

Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan emphasized that Moragne
had created a pure wrongful death action predicated "upon the death
itself and independent of any action the decedent may have had for his
own personal injuries.'

03

Since there were two distinct harms action-

able in separate claims, res judicata would not preclude a survivor's
action.1 0 4 The Court conceded, however, that a majority of courts, interpreting both state and federal wrongful death statutes, have held
that a dependent's action is barred by a decedent's recovery. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that such results were based on limitations
found in the particular statutes, rather than upon broader policy considerations or principles of res judicata. 0 5 Since the general maritime
wrongful death remedy was judicially-fashioned, however, it was not
confined by prior statutory restrictions, and the Court could respond
with more flexibility.
[G]uided by the principle of maritime law that "certainly it better
becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy,"' 06
10 7
the Court sustained the plaintiff's cause of action.
Since the libellant's claims for loss of services, society, and funeral
expenses did not accrue until the decedent's death, the Court did not
consider them in response to the respondent's double recovery argument.10 8 The possibility of a double recovery is relevant, however,
when a decedent has been compensated in his own right for lost wages,
and his dependents subsequently claim lost support'0 9 in a death action.
The majority, however, foreclosed this possibility by relying upon the
102
103
104
105
106

94
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

S. Ct. at 811, 814.
at 811 (footnote omitted).
at 811-12.
at 812.
at 814 (quoting from The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (No. 12,578) (C.C.D. Md.

1865)).
107 94 S. Ct. at 814. The Court determined that the underlying consideration of the
wrongful death remedy was to compensate
the dependents for their losses resulting from the decedent's death, [and] the
remedy should not be precluded merely because the decedent, during his lifetime, is able to obtain a judgment for his own personal injuries.
Id. (emphasis by the Court).
108 Id. at 818.
109 Id. Support as defined by the Court includes "all the financial contributions that
the decedent would have made to his dependents had he lived." Id. at 814.
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doctrine of collateral estoppel. Reasoning that a decedent acts in a fiduciary capacity when he brings his own action, and represents his dependents' interest in his support when he recovers for his lost wages, Justice
Brennan felt that "familiar principles" 1 0 of collateral estoppel would
preclude the dependents from re-litigating the support issue, at least to
the extent of that portion of the dependent's expected support represented by the earlier award."'
Although not a subject of the double liability problem, society and
funeral expenses were recoveries not uniformly accepted in either
federal or state jurisdictions prior to Gaudet. Nevertheless, in sustaining
Mrs. Gaudet's cause of action, the Court allowed both as elements of
damages. Traditionally the fear of excessive verdicts and the inability
to reasonably estimate non-pecuinary losses had limited statutory
wrongful death recovery, either explicitly or by judicial construction, to
damages representing pecuniary losses suffered by the beneficiary or the
estate." 2 Recovery under DOHSA, the statute Moragne suggested as
guidance for the courts, has been confined to "fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained.""13 Sentimental damages, such as
14
grief, society, and companionship, therefore, have been excluded.
,Similar results have been reached under FELA, which does not specifically limit damages. 115 The Court recognized, however, that a majority
of states viewed loss of society as a compensable injury and identified a
discernable trend toward liberalizing recovery. 116 Although the Court
110 Id. at 818.
11 Id. at 818-20. The application of collateral estoppel by judgment is limited to
parties and their privies. A non-party, however, whose interests are represented by an
authorized party, is bound to the extent the determination affects his interests. IB
J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE
0.411[l], at 1253 (2d ed. 1974). Since the decedent in his
own damage suit had tacitly represented his dependents for their lost support, collateral
estoppel would apply in subsequent litigation by the survivors to that portion of the
damages collected for it. 94 S. Ct. at 819 & n.30.
112 See notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text. The difficulty in ascribing a
monetary value to loss of society can be appreciated by the Court's use of the term. The
Court said the term embraced "love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort
and protection" but not "mental anguish or grief." 94 S. Ct. at 815 & n.17.
113 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1970).
114 See, e.g., Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 266 (2d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964) (recovery for loss of consortium denied); Middleton v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 577 (1934) (recovery
for loss of society and companionship denied).
115 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970). See Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68, 70-71
(1913); G. GiLumRE & C. BLACK, supra note 44, § 6-31, at 306.
116 94 S. Ct. at 816. Although the decisions are not uniform, the trend in federal
courts since Moragne has been to allow nonpecuniary recovery. See, e.g., In re Farrell Lines,
Inc., 339 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. La. 1971) (loss of son's love and affection); In re Sincere
Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1971) (emotional distress allowed). But see
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felt justified in aligning admiralty law with current state determinations,
it concluded that a like result was compelled
to shape the remedy to comport with the humanitarian policy of
the maritime law to -show "special solicitude" for those who are
117
injured within its jurisdiction.
Thus, since DOHSA did not foreclose non-statutory federal remedies,
the traditional obligation of the judiciary in fashioning admiralty
principles permitted the Court to extend admiralty recovery.11 8 Finally,
in the Court's view speculative and excessive verdicts for the loss of
society would be controlled by measuring damages with "'good sense
and deliberate judgment'" and by appellate review. 119
Condoning only the majority's position allowing damages for lost
services and funeral expenses, 1 ° Justice Powell dissented. In his opinion,
the extensions of admiralty law authorized by the majority were
unsound as a matter of principle, will create difficulty and confusion in the litigation of admiralty cases, and are very likely to
121
result in duplicative recoveries.
Justice Powell observed that for over half a century the majority of
state jurisdictions and decisions under FELA and the Jones Act have
held that a termination of the decedent's claims foreclosed a subsequent
wrongful death action. 122 In Justice Powell's view, when Moragne sugCanal Barge Co., 323 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Miss. 1971), modified sub nom. M/V Elaine Jones,
480 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1973) (society and companionship denied).
117 94 S. Ct. at 816 (footnote omitted).
118 Id. at 816 n.22. See also note 53 supra and accompanying text.
119 Id. at 817 (quoting from -The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 464 (1879)).
Funeral expenses had not been considered a pecuniary loss to dependents because
they had been viewed as an expense of the estate. The Culberson, 61 F.2d 194, 195 (3d
Cir. 1932). In conformity with the majority of states, the Court allowed funeral expenses
as a compensable damage where there was an obligation for such payments. 94 S. Ct. at
818.
120 94 S. Ct. at 825 & n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 820.
122 Id. at 821. To further substantiate his view, Justice Powell relied upon comment
a to section 925 of the Restatement of Torts which deals with the proper measure of
damages for causing the death of another:
"Although the death statutes create a new cause of action, both they and the
survival statutes are dependent upon the rights of the deceased. Hence where
no action could have been brought by the deceased had he not been killed,
no right of action exists. Likewise, a release by the deceased or a judgment
either in his favor or, if won on the merits, in favor of the defendant, bars an
action after his death."
94 S. Ct. at 824 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting from REsrATEmENT OF TORTS, Explanatory
Notes § 925, comment a at 639 (1939)).
It should be noted, however, that the Restatement is addressed to the interpretation
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gested a process of accommodation of the newly created maritime wrongful death remedy with the existing statutes, it did not contemplate
"their abrupt and near-total forced absolescence [sic]. '123 In this respect,
the dissent suggested that the judiciary was now in the dubious position
of ."analogizing to statutes under which the very claim before them
12 4
would be blocked."'
Additionally, the dissent viewed the adoption of society as an
element of compensable harm by the majority as contradictory to the
existing federal admiralty statutes and a line of admiralty cases decided
since Moragne125 Justice Powell was also skeptical of the practical application of the collateral estoppel theory to minimize prospective double
recoveries. In his view this "novel" approach would be difficult to
administer and would pose questions which have not been answered by
the Court.126 Finally, the dissent concluded that by allowing a second
recovery based upon the same wrong, the majority had ignored the
limitation of damages common in absolute liability situations, such as
127
unseaworthiness, as well as judicial aversion to duplicate litigation.
By allowing a survivor's recovery despite a successful suit by the
decedent, the Court has clearly departed from the mainstream of prior
law. Yet the distinctions made in earlier death cases which precluded
the survivor's cause of action, seem to be artificial in light of the spirit
of the wrongful death remedy which evolved to fill a universally recognized remedial void by compensating the survivors of those whose death
was caused by wrongful act. The fundamental premise in most of the
statutory expressions of the wrongful death remedy is that the survivor's
rights do not accrue until death. Thus in theory as well as in practice,
an award during the decedent's lifetime cannot possibly encompass the
unique injury to the survivors. This is particularly true in view of the
recent trend in death cases to free damage awards from strict loss of
support or pecuniary formulas.
The result reached by the Court comports with the spirit of flexibility and compassion which has traditionally been the hallmark of
maritime law. The decision, however, is not without its shortcomings.
As suggested by Justice Powell, Gaudet has discarded the limitations in
both the Jones Act and DOHSA in expanding the general maritime
of wrongful death statutes for measuring damages, whereas the majority's position is
founded upon a general maritime remedy for wrongful death.
123 94 S. Ct. at 823 (Powell, J., dissenting).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 825-26 & n.18.
126 Id. at 826-27 & n21.
127 Id. at 827-28.
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wrongful death remedy. Consequently, litigants whose claims entitle
them to proceed either under general maritime law, or pursuant to one
of the statutory schemes can be expected to rely primarily upon the
more generous possibilities offered by the general maritime remedy. 128
In this respect, the remedy engendered by Moragne, which was originally fashioned to supplement the existing statutory remedial framework,
may well eclipse the remedies it was intended to complement. The
limitations found in the admiralty wrongful death statutes, however,
were judicially engrafted, 129 and there appears to be no fundamental
reason why these restrictions cannot be relaxed indirectly by expanding
the scope of recovery under the general maritime law which is the
product of the judicial process. In any event, Gaudet represents a
significant step in the evolution of the general maritime wrongful
death remedy.
William R. Barker
128 In summarizing the effect of the majority's decision, Justice Powell in his dissent
emphasized:
Given the sweep of the majority's approach, the upshot in many areas will be a
nearly total nullification of the congressional enactments previously governing
maritime wrongful death. Except for a technical joinder of counts to obtain a
jury and thus to maximize the benefits promised by the Court's opinion, no one
entitled to rely on the admiralty doctrine of unseaworthiness will, after today,
seek relief under the federal maritime wrongful death statutes. Several limitations built into those congressional enactments have been swept aside by the
majority's decision.
Id. at 820.
129 The Jones Act created a federal wrongful death remedy for seamen by applying
the FELA to those within the purview of the Act. See note 75 supra and accompanying
text. Since the Jones Act expressly incorporated the FELA, the judicial principles which
evolved under the FELA are also applicable to Jones Act cases. Thus, in Kernan v.
American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958), a case arising under the Jones Act, the
Court had no difficulty applying judicial principles developed under the FELA to the case
at bar:
We find no difficulty in applying these principles, developed under the FELA,
to the present action under the Jones Act, for the latter Act expressly provides
for seamen the cause of action-and consequently the entire judicially developed doctrine of liability--granted to railroad workers by the FELA. The deceased seaman here was in a position perfectly analogous to that of the railroad
workers allowed recovery in the line of cases we have discussed, and the principles
governing those cases dearly should apply here.
Id. at 439. Cases decided under the FELA, moreover, have consistently held that a
settlement of a decedent's claim, or a judgment recovered during his lifetime, precludes a
subsequent wrongful death action. See, e.g., Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U.S. 335 (1928). See
also 94 S.Ct. at 821 (Powell, J., dissenting) and cases cited therein.
With respect to DOHSA, the majority of the Court in Gaudet concluded that the Act,
unlike the FELA, has not been interpreted as barring a survivor's wrongful death action
when the decedent has already recovered for personal injuries during his lifetime. Id.
at 814 n.10. Justice Powell, however, in his dissent characterized this conclusion as "conjectural," and expressed the view that in enacting DOHSA, Congress contemplated only
one recovery in this context. Id. at 822.

